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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 43, NO. 4
THE NEBRASKA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
ARTICLE 3- COMMERCIAL PAPER.
Rodney Shkolnick*
At midnight on September 1, 1965, the Uniform Commercial
Code will become operative in Nebraska. The Code repeals the
Nebraska version of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, and
Article 3 of the Code will cover the subject of "Commercial Paper."
Although Article 3 largely retains the substance of the N.I.L., new
language, and sometimes new approaches are apparent. While a
section by section treatment of Article 3 is beyond the scope of this
paper, we will here attempt to take an overall look at Article 3 with
particular attention to those instances wherein the Code changes
the law as it existed under the N.I.L., or attempts to settle areas
of conflict which had arisen under the N.I.L.
THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 3.
Article 3 of the Code does not purport to cover all negotiable
paper. Section 3-103(1) of the Code specifically excludes money,
investment securities and documents of title.1 The instruments
embraced within the provisions of Article 3 are the draft (bill of
exchange), the check, the certificate of deposit, and the note.2
FomvAL REQUISITES OF NEGOTIABILITY.
Like the N.I.L., Article 3 of the Code sets forth certain formal
requirements which an instrument must meet to be negotiable
*B.A., J.D., State University of Iowa; Member Nebraska and Iowa Bar;
Assistant Professor of Law, Creighton University.
'Investment Securities are covered by Article 8 and Documents of Title
by Article 7. Closely connected with the law of commercial paper is
the material embraced in Article 4 of the Code-Bank Deposits and
Collections. See, for example, § 4-402 covering a bank's liability for
wrongful dishonor; § 4-403 covering stop payment orders and § 4-406
which covers the depositor's duty to examine his returned checks and
discover and notify the bank of forged or altered items.
2 UNIFORM Co mnvmiucAL CODE § 3-104 (hereinafter cited as U.C.C.).
3 Comment 1 to the 1958 official text of the Code indicates that Article
3 "leaves open the possibility that some other writings may be made
negotiable by other statutes or by judicial decisions."
4U.C.C. § 3-104.
5 NEB. REV. STAT. § 62-101 (Reissue 1958).
6 U.C.C. §§ 3-105, 3-114.
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within Article 3.3 The instrument must be signed by the maker or
drawer; contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money; be payable on demand or at a definite time,
and be payable to order or to bearer.4 These requisites are sub-
stantially the same as those set forth in the N.I.L.,5 and are elabo-
rated upon by succeeding sections of the Code.6
UNCONDITIONAL PROMICE OR ORDER.
In order to be negotiable, the instrument must contain an
unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and
"no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker
or drawer except as authorized by this article."7 In connection with
this requirement, the Commercial Code, as did the N.I.L.,8 dis-
tinguishes between notations in instruments which are merely
bookkeeping references and notations which have the purpose or
effect of conditioning the order or promise to pay upon the existence
of a particular fund. Section 3-105 (1) (f) provides that an order
or promise is not made conditional by the fact that the instrument
"indicates a particular account to be debited or any other fund
or source from which reimbursement is expected," while section
3-105 (2) (b) provides that an order or promise is not unconditional
if the instrument "states that it is to be paid only out of a particular
fund or source except as provided in this section." The exceptions
mentioned in section 3-105 (2) (b) refers to subsections which pro-
vide that the order or promise is not made conditional by the fact
that payment is limited to a particular fund or source if the instru-
ment is issued by a government or governmental agency9 or the
"... assets of a partnership, unincorporated association, trust or
estate by or on behalf of which the instrument is issued."'10
The Code also provides, as did the N.I.L., that references to the
transaction giving rise to the instrument, or to separate agreements,
or that the obligation is secured, do not destroy the negotiability
of the instrument," but a promise or order which "states that it is
subject to or governed by any other agreement;" is not uncondi-
tional.12
7U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (b). Section 3-112 of the Code contains, among other
provisions, a list of powers and obligations which the instrument may
contain without affecting its negotiability.
8 NEB. REv. STAT. § 62-103 (Reissue 1958).
9 U.C.C. § 3-105 (1) (g).
10 U.C.C. § 3-105 (1) (h).
11U.C.C. § 3-105(1).
12 U.C.C. § 3-105 (2) (a).
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PAYABLE ON DEMAND OR AT A DEFINITE TIME.
In connection with the requirement that the instrument be
payable on demand or at a definite time, the Commercial Code
reverses the rule of the N.I.L. that an instrument payable on or at
a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified event which is
certain to happen though the time of happening be uncertain may
be negotiable. 13 Thus an instrument payable "one day after my
death" will no longer be negotiable in Nebraska.' 4 The greatest
difficulty that the courts had in connection with the requirement
that an instrument be payable at a definite time was with instru-
ments which contained acceleration clauses. 5 The Code clarifies
this area by providing in subsection 3-109 (1) (c) that an instrument
is payable at a definite time if it is payable at "a definite time
subject to any acceleration," thus making it clear that acceleration
has nothing to do with the concept of negotiability. 6 The Coin-
merical Code treats the question of instruments which provide for
extensions of the time of payment in a similar fashion. The instru-
ment may provide for payment at a definite time "subject to exten-
sion at the option of the holder, or to extension to a further definite
time at the option of the maker or acceptor or automatically upon
or after a specified act or event.' 7
WORDS OF NEGOTIABILITY.
The requirement that the instrument contain words of nego-
tiability, i.e., be payable to order or bearer, is amplified and clarified
13 U.C.C. § 3-109 (2). Under NEB. REv. STAT. 62-104(3) such an instrument
was payable at a determinable future time.
14 Although the question of negotiability was not in issue, Keeler v. Estate
of Hiles, 103 Neb. 465, 172 N.W. 363 (1919) stated that an instrument so
payable was negotiable under the Nebraska Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law.
15See BRmON, BILLS AND NoTEs §§ 26-30 (2d ed. 1961).
16 While an instrument which is payable on a fixed date or sooner at the
option of the holder if he deems himself insecure is not nonnegotiable
because of uncertainty as to time, § 1-208 of the Code requires, with
regard to such clauses, that the holder shall have the power to ac-
celerate "only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment
or performance is impaired."
While as noted, an instrument payable "one day after my death"
- is not negotiable under the Code, it has been pointed out that the same
purpose can be accomplished in a negotiable instrument by use of
an acceleration clause. An instrument made payable at a sufficiently
distant definite future time but accelerated by the death of an indi-
vidual would appear to be payable at a definite time under the Com-
mercial Code. HAwKLAmw, Co iERcIAL PAPER §2(d) (1959).
17U.C.C. § 3-109 (1)(d).
NEBRASKA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
by sections 3-110 and 3-111 of the Commercial Code. Instruments
payable to the order of estates, trusts, funds, partnerships or unin-
corporated associations are order instruments under the Commercial
Code, 8 thus avoiding any problem of whether an instrument so
payable is order or bearer paper. Under the N.I.L. there was a
conflict of authority as to whether an instrument which contained
the words "payable upon the return of this instrument properly
indorsed" was payable to order.19 The Code settles the question by
providing that an instrument not otherwise payable to order is not
made so by the presence of such language.20
In addition to these formal requisites of negotiability, the
Commercial Code sets forth in section 3-112 a list of terms and
omissions which do not affect the negotiability of an instrument
which is otherwise negotiable. Among the more important of the
provisions which may be included in a negotiable instrument are:
a statement that collateral has been given for the instrument
or in case of default on the instrument the collateral may be sold;21
a promise or power to maintain or protect collateral or to give
additional collateral;22
a term in a draft providing that the payee by indorsing it or
cashing it acknowledges full satisfaction of the obligation of the
drawer.23
Section 3-121 of the Commercial Code also effects a change in
the law as set forth in the Nebraska Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law. Under the N.I.L. an instrument made payable at a
bank was "equivalent to an order to the bank to pay the same for
the account of the principal debtor thereon. ' 24 Under the Com-
mercial Code a note or acceptance so payable "is not of itself an
order or authorization to the bank to pay it," 25 and an instrument
"payable through a bank" does not "of itself authorize the bank
to pay the instrument."26
1sU.C.C. §§ 3-110(1) (e), (f), (g); 3-111.
19 See BrTToN, BILLs AND NoTEs § 24 (2d. ed. 1961).
20U.C.C. § 3-110(2).
21U.C.C. § 3-112(1)(b).
22U.C.C. § 3-112(1) (c).
23 U.C.C. § 3-112(1) (f).
2 4 NEB. REV. STAT. § 62-187 (Reissue 1958).
25U.C.C. § 3-121. This section was offered in alternative form with the
alternative form providing "A note or acceptance which states that it
is payable at a bank is the equivalent of a draft drawn on the bank
payable when it falls due out of any funds of the maker or acceptor in
current account or otherwise available for such payment." Many juris-
dictions have adopted this form of § 3-121 just as many had amended
their version of the N.I.L.
26U.C.C. § 3-120.
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TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION.
Part 2 of Article 3 of the Code covers the area of transfer and
negotiation. Transfer is a broad term covering all cases where one
party passes his rights in the instrument to another, while nego-
tiation ". . . is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the
transferee becomes a holder."27 As under the N.I.L., bearer instru-
ments are negotiated by delivery alone, while instruments payable
to order are negotiated by delivery with any necessary indorse-
ments.
28
Several situations involving the question of whether an instru-
ment was payable to bearer or to order, and thus whether an
indorsement was necessary in order to negotiate the instrument
which arose under the N.I.L. have been dealt with and settled by
the Commercial Code. Under section 40 of the N.I.L.29 and instru-
ment payable to bearer was always negotiable by delivery alone
even though it bore a later special indorsement i.e., "pay to the order
of John Jones." The Code reverses this rule by providing that the
indorsement of the special indorsee is necessary for further negotia-
tions of the instrument o and this also renders moot the question
of whether section 40 of the N.I.L. applied only to an instrument
which was originally payable to bearer.
Two other situations with which the courts have had difficulty
under the N.I.L. were those involving imposters and cases where an
employee of the drawer, who was to furnish names of proper
payees to the official with authority to draw checks, padded the list
intending to later withdraw and negotiate the additional checks
himself.
In the imposter cases-where the drawer or maker was induced
by the imposter to issue an instrument to the imposter under his
assumed name-the problem was whether the imposter's indorse-
ment was effective. Under prior law the result often turned upon
whether the impersonation took place in a face to face situation or
use of the mails.3 ' Under the Code the indorsement by any person
in the name of the named payee in an imposter situation is effective
without regard to the method by which the impersonation was
accomplished.3 2 In the situation where an employee or agent of the
27U.C.C. § 3-202(1).
28U.C.C. § 3-202(1).
2 9 EB. REv. STAT. § 62-140 (Reissue 1958).
3oU.C.C. § 3-204(2).
31 See BrTON, BnLLs AND Noms § 151 (2d ed. 1961).
32U.C.C. § 3-405 (1)(a).
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drawer or maker furnishes the drawer or maker with the name of
a payee intending that the payee shall have no interest in the
instrument, the Code again provides that an indorsement by any
person in the name of the named payee is effective,33 thus avoiding
the necessity that existed under the N.I.L. of determining whether
such instruments were in fact payable to fictitious payees and
thus payable to bearer.
The treatment of indorsements under the Code is, with several
exceptions substantially the same as under the N.I.L. The indorse-
ment may be special3 4 or in blank35 and it may be qualified 0 or
restrictive.37 The conditional indorsement is under the Code a form
of restrictive indorsement.38 While a restrictive indorsement pre-
vented further negotiation under the N.I.L.,39 the Code reverses
this rule and permits restrictive indorsees and subsequent owners
to be holders in due course under certain conditions. 40
LIABILITY OF PARTIES.
The Code presents a systematic and much more complete cover-
age of the questions of the liabilities of parties to negotiable instru-
ments then was set forth in the N.I.L. Many of the Code provisions
in this area are, to be sure, declaratory of existing case law, but
they represent a first attempt at codification.
Section 3-413 sets forth the liability of the maker, drawer, and
acceptor with no substantial change from that provided in the N.I.L.:
(1) The maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the instru-
ment according to its tenor at the time of his engagement or
33 U.C.C. § 3-405 (1) (b).
34U.C.C. § 3-204(1).
5 U.C.C.§ 3-204(1).
36U.C.C. § 3-414(1).
37 U.C.C. § 3-205.
88 U.C.C. § 3-205 (a).
s9 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 62-136, 62-137, 62-147 (Reissue 1958).
40U.C.C. § 3-206(1). Subsections 3-206(2), (3) and (4) set forth rules
to govern the position of the restrictive indorsee and subsequent takers
of the restrictively indorsed instrument. They generally require the
first taker to apply any value consistently with the indorsement and,
to the extent this is done and the taker otherwise meets the require-
ments of due course holding, he is a holder in due course. Any bank
within the collecting process, except the depository bank or the first
taker, is not affected by the restrictive indorsement. Later holders for
value of an instrument indorsed for the benefit of the indorser or an-
other person are not affected by such restrictive indorsements unless
they have knowledge that the negotiation was in breach of duty.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 43, NO. 4
as completed pursuant to Section 3-115 on incomplete instru-
ments.
(2) The drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and any
necessary notice of dishonor or protest he will pay the amount
of the draft to the holder or to any indorser who takes it up.
The drawer may disclaim this liability by drawing without
recourse.
(3) By making, drawing or accepting the party admits as against
all subsequent parties including the drawee the existence of
the payee and his then capacity to indorse.
The Code, however, does change the law with respect to when
a drawer becomes an acceptor. Under the N.I.L. the acceptance or
certification did not have to appear on the instrument41 and where
the drawee destroyed or refused to return a bill presented for
acceptance the drawee was deemed to have accepted the instru-
ment.42 Under the Code the acceptance or certification must be
written on the draft or check 43 while a drawee who refuses to return
an instrument or who makes collateral promises or representations
concerning the instrument will not be an acceptor of the instrument,
he may still incur liability in tort or contract for these activities
under subsections 3-419 (1) (a) and (b) and 3-409 (2) of the Code.
Thus a drawee who refuses to return an instrument presented
for acceptance or payment has converted the instrument 44 and is
liable for the face amount of the instrument.45
The indorser's contract is set forth in subsection 3-414(1) of
the Code, which provides:
Unless the indorsement otherwise specifies (as by such words as
"without recourse") every indorser engages that upon dishonor and
any necessary notice of dishonor and protest he will pay the
instrument according to its tenor at the time of his indorsement to
the holder or to any subsequent indorser who takes it up, even
though the indorser who takes it up was not obligated to do so.
Under the Code, as under the N.I.L., the liability of drawers
and indorsers is secondary in the sense that presentment, dishonor,
notice of dishonor and (in a few cases) protest are ordinarily con-
ditions precedent to actions against them.46 Part 5 of Article 3 of
the Code collects and states the rules as to the necessity, time for,
and method of performing these conditions precedent and when the
41 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 62-1,134, 62-1, 135 (Reissue 1958).
42 NEB. REv. STAT. § 1,137 (Reissue 1958).
4U.C.C. §§ 3-410(1), 3-411(1).
4 U.C.C.§ 3-419(1) (a) and (b).
45 U.C.C.§ 3-419(2).
46U.C.C. §§ 3-413(2), 3-414(1), 3-501.
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performance of these conditions have been excused or waived. In
connection with the requirements of presentment, notice of dishonor
and protest it should be noted that section 3-501(3) of the Code
has virtually eliminated the necessity for protest by providing that
it is necessary to charge drawees and indorsers of any draft which
appears on its face to be drawn or payable outside of the states
and territories of the United States and the District of Columbia.
One of the problems which has plagued courts under the N.I.L.
involved the time within which a demand instrument must be
presented for payment. Under the N.I.L. the instrument had to be
presented "within a reasonable time after its issue, except that in
the case of a bill of exchange, presentment for payment will be
sufficient if made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation
thereof."47 The Code still uses "reasonable time" to determine the
time within which presentment for payment is necessary with
respect to liability of secondary parties, but the time is measured
from the time the particular party became liable on the instru-
ment,48 and the Code sets forth certain presumptions as to what
constitutes a reasonable time in the case of an uncertified check.
Subsection 3-503 (2) provides in part:
In the case of an uncertified check which is drawn and payable
within the United States and which is not a draft drawn by a bank
the following are presumed to be reasonable periods within which
to present for payment or to initiate bank collection: I
a) with respect to the liability of the drawer, thirty days after
date or issue whichever is later; and
b) with respect to the liability of an indorser, seven days after
his indorsement.
LIABILITY OF GUARANTOR.
In addition to setting forth the contracts of the maker, drawer,
acceptor and indorser, the Code provides certain rules in section
3-416 concerning the liability of a party who adds words of guaranty
to his signature. One who guaranties payment engages "that if the
instrument is not paid when due he will pay it according to its tenor
without resort by the holder to any other party."49 One who guar-
anties collection also engages to pay the instrument, but only after
"the holder has reduced his claim against the maker or acceptor to
judgment and execution has been returned unsatisfied, or after the
maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is otherwise apparent
47NEB. REV. STAT. § 62-171 (Reissue 1958).
4U.C.C. § 3-503(1) (e).
49U.C.C. § 3-416(1).
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that it is useless to proceed against him."50 The user of words of
guaranty waives presentment, notice of dishonor and protest.51
LiAILITY OF THOSE WHO SIGN IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY.
If the signature of one who claims to be an agent appears on an
instrument, the liability of the agent on the instrument depends
upon the manner in which the representative capacity is indicated.
If the instrument "neither names the person represented nor shows
that the signature was in a representative capacity," the agent is
personally obligated.5 2 The agent is also personally obligated except
as "otherwise established between the immediate parties" if the
instrument names the person represented but does not show that
the representative signed in a representative capacity or if the
instrument shows that the representative signed in a representative
capacity but does not name the person represented.53
WARRANTIES ON TRANSFER OF A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENT.
In addition to any liability which he might incur as an indorser
of an instrument, one who transfers a negotiable instrument for
consideration or obtains payment or acceptance of the instrument
makes certain warranties under which he may incur liability.
Subsections 3-417 (2) and (3) set forth the warranties made
by a person who transfers an instrument to subsequent holders.
(2) Any person who transfers an instrument and receives con-
sideration warrants to his transferee and if the transfer is by
indorsement to any subsequent holder who takes the instru-
ment in good faith that
a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to
obtain payment or acceptance on behalf of one who has a
good title and the transfer is otherwise rightful; and
b) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
c) the instrument has not been materially altered; and
d) no defense of any party is good against him; and
e) he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding in-
stituted with respect to the maker or acceptor or the drawer
of an unaccepted instrument.
(3) By transferring "without recourse" the transferor limits the
obligation stated in subsection (2) (d) to a warranty that he
has no knowledge of such a defense.
50 U.C.C. § 3-416(2).
51U.C.C. § 3-416(5).
52 U.C.C. § 3-403 (2) (a).
53 U.C.C. § 3-403 (2) (b). The Commercial Code thus would allow the use
of parol evidence to establish the non-liability of the agent between
the immediate parties in a case governed by § 3-403(2) (b).
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A significant change from prior law involved in this section
is that the warranties are made only by a transferor who receives
consideration, thus apparently imposing no warranty liability upon
the accommodation indorser. It is also to be noted that the war-
ranties made by one who transfers by an indorsement extend to
all subsequent holders who take the instrument in good faith even
though the indorsement is qualified-i.e. "without recourse".
FnvALITY OF PAYMENT AND ACCEPTANCE
AND WARRANTIEs ON PRESENTMENT.
In the famous case of Price v. Nea, 54 it was held that a drawee
who paid two drafts which bore the forged signature of the drawer
could not recover the money from the good faith holder for value
who received the payment. The Commercial Code adopts the doc-
trine of finality of payment of Price v. Neal, and extends it to
similar situations. Section 3-418 of the Commercial Code provides:
Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the Article
on Bank Deposits and Collections (Article 4) and except for lia-
bility for breach of warranty on presentment under the preceding
section, payment or acceptance of any instrument in final in favor
of a holder in due course, or a person who has in good faith
changed his position in reliance on the payment.
The warranties on presentment referred to in this section are
set forth in section 3-417 (1) of the Commercial Code. With respect
to the signature of the maker or drawer section 3-417 (1) (b) of
the Code provides that the party who obtains payment or acceptance
and any prior transferor warrants to one who in good faith pays
or accepts that:
b) he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer
is unauthorized, except that this warranty is not given by a
holder in due course acting in good faith
i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature,
whether or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
iii) to an acceptor of a draft if the holder in due course took the
draft after the acceptance or obtained the acceptance with-
out knowledge that the drawer's signature was unauthor-
ized....
Under these provisions the only warranty made is one of no
knowledge that the signature is unauthorized and even this war-
ranty is not made by a holder in due course acting in good faith in
the situations set forth in section 3-417 (1) (b) (i), (ii) and (iii).
54 3 Burr. 1355, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
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Section 3-417(1) (c) covers the warranties against material
alterations of the instrument and provides:
c) the instrument has not been materially altered, except that
this warranty is not given by a holder in due course acting in
good faith
i) to the maker of a note; or
ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer is also
the drawee; or
iii) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration made
prior to the acceptance if the holder in due course took the
draft after the acceptance, even though the acceptance
provided "payable as originally drawn" or equivalent
terms; or
iv) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration made
after the acceptance.
Subsections 3-417(1) (c) (iii) and (ii) settle certain problems
which have arisen with regard to alterations and accepted instru-
ments. Under these provisions, an acceptor does not receive a war-
ranty that the instrument has not been materially altered from a
holder in due course acting in good faith with respect to an altera-
tion made after the acceptance nor does he receive a warranty
with respect to an alteration made prior to acceptance if the holder
in due course took the draft after the acceptance even though the
acceptance provides "payable as originally drawn" or the like. Thus
if a check is drawn for $10 and, prior to certification, it is raised
to $100 and then, after certification, is negotiated to a holder in
due course the bank may not charge back against the holder in
due course to whom it pays $100. Similarly if a $10 check is certi-
fied and then raised to $100 and negotiated to a holder in due
course, the bank may not charge back against the holder in due
course to whom it pays $100.
As mentioned earlier, the provision of the Commercial Code
respecting finality of payment and acceptance 55 is not limited to
cases of material alteration or the forged signature of a drawer or
maker. As indicated in comment 2 to the official text of section
3-418, payment made in the case where the drawers account was
overdrawn or otherwise in error as to the state of the drawers
account would be final.
The payor or acceptor does receive a warranty protecting him
against forged indorsements.56 While the drawee may not properly
charge its depositor's account for a payment made on a forged in-
dorsement, and has recourse against its transferors on their war-
55 U.C.C. § 3-418.
56U.C.C. § 3-417 (1) (a).
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ranty, the law under the N.I.L. was in conflict as to whether the
holder whose indorsement had been forged had a cause of action
against the drawee who paid on the forged indorsement of the
holder.57 In Anschutz v. Central National Bank of Columbus,58
the payee of certain checks initiated an action against the drawee.
The payee alleged that the checks had fallen into the possession
of another while unindorsed and that the indorsement of the payee
was a forgery. In holding that the payee did not state a cause of
action against the drawee who paid the checks to subsequent in-
dorsees the court stated: 59
We hold a drawee bank who unwittingly pays a check to a sub-
sequent indorser where the indorsement of the payee was previ-
ously forged is not liable in an action by the payee either on con-
tract or for money had and received or for conversion.
In so far as the Anschutz case holds that the former holder of
the instrument may not maintain an action against the drawee its
holding is reversed by the Commercial Code which provides that
payment on a forged indorsement is a conversion of the instru-
ment.60 In such a case the drawee is liable for the face amount of
the instrument.61 A collecting bank is not, however, liable to the
former holder in conversion or otherwise for handling an instru-
ment bearing the forged indorsement of the holder except that the
collecting bank may be compelled to turn over any of the proceeds
of the instrument which it still possesses.
62
HOLDERS, TRANSFEREES AND DEFENSES.
A "holder" is defined in the Code as one "who is in possession
* . .of an instrument . . .drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to
his order or to bearer or in blank."6 3 In order for the holder to be
a holder in due course under section 3-302 of the Code, he must
take the instrument for value,64 in good faith6 5 and without notice
that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against
or claim to it on the part of any person.66
57 See BRr-TON, BILs AND NoTEs § 146 (2d ed. 1961).
58 173 Neb. 60, 112 N.W.2d 545 (1961).
59 Id. at 70, 112 N.W.2d at 551.
6oU.C.C. § 3-419(1) (c).
61 U.C.C. § 3-419(2).
62 U.C.C. § 3-419(3).
63 U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
64U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (a).
65U.C.C. § 3-302(1)(b).
66U.C.C. § 3-302(1)(c).
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While these requirements are substantially the same as set
forth in section 52 of the N.I.L.,67 the Code does contain some modi-
fications and clarifications which should be noted. Subsection 52 (1)
of the N.I.L. required that the instrument be "complete and regular
upon its face." Under the Code this requirement is not set forth in
section 3-302 but is found in a modified form in section 3-304 which
provides that the purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if the
instrument is so incomplete or irregular "as to call into question its
validity, terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the
party to pay."68 In accord with this provision is subsection 3-304-
(4) (e) which provides that knowledge that an incomplete instru-
ment has been completed does not give the purchaser notice of a
claim or defense unless the purchaser has notice of any improper
completion.
Section 3-304 states several other rules which elaborate upon
and explain the requirements that the holder take the instrument
without notice of a claim or defense or that it is overdue. Under
these rules knowledge that the instrument is postdated or antedated
or that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory
promise or accompanied by a separate agreement does not give the
purchaser notice of a claim or defense.69 The purchaser does
have notice of a claim or defense if he knows that a fiduciary has
negotiated the instrument for his own benefit or in payment of
or as security for his own debt70 but mere knowledge that the per-
son negotiating the instrument is a fiduciary does not give the
purchaser notice.71
The Code does somewhat clarify the question of when a pur-
chaser has notice that an instrument is overdue. In the case of an
instrument which contains an acceleration clause, the purchaser
must have reason to know that acceleration has been made before
he has notice that the instrument is overdue.7 2 In the case of a
demand instrument, the purchaser must have notice either that
demand had been made, or that he is taking the instrument more
than a reasonable length of time after its issue.7 3 Although the
question of what constitutes a "reasonable length of time" is not
6 7 NEB. REV. STAT. § 62-152 (Reissue 1958).
6sU.C.C. § 3-304(1) (a).
69U.C.C. § 3-304(4) (a), (b).
7ou.C.C. § 3-304(2).
1U.C.C. § 3-304(4)(e).
72U.C.C. § 3-304(3)(b).
73U.C.C. § 3-304(3) (c).
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definitely answered by the Commercial Code with regard to de-
mand instruments generally, 4 the Commercial Code does provide
that thirty days is presumed to be a reasonable time for a check
drawn and payable within the states and territories of the United
States and the District of Columbia.75
Some specific instances are set forth in which the holder does
not become a holder in due course. The taking of an instrument
under legal process or the purchase of the instrument at a judicial
sale does not make the purchaser a holder in due course,70 nor does
the acquisition of the instrument in taking over an estate77 or as
part of a bulk transaction not in the regular course of business of
the transferor.78
The Code settles the question of whether a payee may be a
holder in due course if he otherwise meets the requirements by
simply stating "A payee may be a holder in due course" while
ordinarily a payee will not be able to qualify as a holder in due
course because he will ordinarily have been involved in the events
of the transaction and the issuance of the instrument that he would
have notice of any claims or defenses to the instrument, there are
situations where this is not the case. Comment 2 to the official
text of the Code gives several cases illustrating when a payee may
be a holder in due course of which the following is representative.
"D draws a check payable to P but blank as to the amount, and
gives it to his agent to be delivered to P. The agent fills in the
check with an excessive amount, and P takes it for value, in good
faith and without notice."
The requirement that a holder in due course take the instru-
ment for value is elaborated upon in section 3-303 of the Commer-
cial Code. Under these provisions a holder takes the instrument for
value:
a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed
or that he acquires a security interest in or a lien on the in-
strument otherwise than by legal process; or
b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for
an antecedent claim against any person whether or not the
claim is due; or
74 U.C.C. § 1-204(2) provides: 'What is a reasonable time for taking an/
action depends on the nature, purpose and circumstances of such action."
75U.C.C. § 3-304(3) (c).
76U.C.C. § 3-302(3) (a).
77 U.C.C. § 3-302 (3) (b).
78U.C.C. § 3-302(3) (c).
79 U.C.C. § 3-302(2).
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c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an ir-
revocable commitment to a third person.
The importance of being a holder in due course or having the
rights of a holder in due course lies, of course, in the fact that the
holder in due course takes the instrument free of certain defenses
which would otherwise be available to the obligor. Section 3-305
of the Code states the rights of a holder in due course as follows:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes
the instrument free from
1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the
holder has not dealt except
a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple con-
tract; and
b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the trans-
action, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign
the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable op-
portunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential
terms; and
d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when
he takes the instrument.
While section 3-306 dealing with the rights of one who does not
have the rights of a holder in due course states:
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person
takes the instrument subject to
a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and
b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an ac-
tion on a simple contract; and
c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, nonper-
formance of any condition precedent, nondelivery, or de-
livery for a special purpose; and
d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the
instrument acquired it by theft, or that payment or satisfac-
tion to such holder would be inconsistent with the terms of
a restrictive indorsement. The claim of any third person
to the instrument is not otherwise available as a defense to
any party liable thereon unless the third person himself
defends the action for such party.
As can be seen from the provisions quoted, the defenses avail-
able against a holder in due course (commonly called "real" de-
fenses) are those which generally go to the existence of a contract.
Under the N.I.L. non-delivery of an incomplete instrument is a
real defense. 0 The Commercial Code reverses this rule and allows
a holder in due course to enforce the instrument as completed.8 '
80 NEB. REv. STAT. § 62-115 (Reissue 1958).
81 U.C.C. §§ 3-115(2), 3-407(3).
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The provision of subsection 3-305(2) (e), set forth above, that
the holder in due course takes subject to any other discharge of
which he has notice when he takes the instrument should be read
in conjunction with section 3-601 of the Commercial Code, and the
sections therein referred to which govern the discharge from li-
ability of a party on a negotiable instrument.
Several of the Code provisions relating to discharge are worth
noting here. According to section 3-603 of the Code, an obligor,
with two exceptions, may safely pay the holder of the instrument
even though he has knowledge of a claim of another person to the
instrument unless the adversely claiming party enjoins payment or
adequately secures the obligor.8 2
The discharge or defense resulting from alteration referred to
in section 3-601 (f) of the Code is covered in detail in section 3-407.
A subsequent holder in due course may enforce the instrument ac-
cording to its original tenor,83 and of course may proceed against
those who transferred the instrument for value after the altera-
tion under the warranties set forth in section 3-417 (2) (c) of the
CodeM or under their contract of indorsement under section 3-414 (1)
wherein the unqualified indorser engages, upon performance of
any necessary conditions precedent, to pay the instrument "ac-
cording to its tenor at the time of his indorsement." In connection
with the question of material alteration the Commercial Code pre-
vents any party from asserting the alteration against a holder in
due course, a drawee or other payor if the party "by his negligence
substantially contributes" to the material alteration.8 5
82 The two exceptions to this rule are found in §§ 3-603(1) (a) and (b)
which provide that there is no discharge
a) of a party who in bad faith pays or satisfies a holder who ac-
quired the instrument by theft or who (unless having the rights
of a holder in due course) holds through one who so acquired
it; or
b) of a party (other than an intermediary bank or a payor bank
which is not a depositary bank) who pays or satisfies the holder
of an instrument which has been restrictively indorsed in a
manner not consistent with the terms of such restrictive in-
dorsement.
Under §§ 119 and 88 of the N.I.L. payment with notice of an adverse
claim could not safely be made by the obligor. In connection with §
3-603, § 3-306(d) which denies the defense of jus tertii except where
the third party is a party to the action should be noted.
83 U.C.C. § 3-407 (3).
84 The transferor's warranties under § 3-417 (2) run only to his immediate
transferee unless the transfer is by indorsement.
85 U.C.C. § 3-406.
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Although the courts had protected drawees in the case of a
material alteration of an instrument which was negligently exe-
cuted by the drawer, there was a conflict as to whether a holder
in due course was entitled to the same protection. The Commercial
Code, as noted, protects the holder in due course.
The Commercial Code also provides that the impairment by
the holder of an instrument of the rights of recourse which one
party to the instrument has against another may discharge the in-
jured party.8 6 If a holder without an express reservation to rights
or the consent of a party who the holder knows has a right of re-
course, either releases or agrees not to sue any person against
whom the party has a right of recourse or agrees to suspend the
right to enforce the instrument against, or otherwise discharges
such a person, the party having the right of recourse is discharged
to that extent.8 7 A party is also discharged to the extent that a
holder "unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument
given by or on behalf of the party or any person against whom he
has a right of recourse."' '8 Since the Code expressly provides that
an accommodation party has a right of recourse against the party
accommodated8 9 it is clear that a holder may not discharge an ac-
commodation maker or acceptor unless he secures consent or ex-
pressly reserves his rights against such a party.
Since the right of a party to recover in an action on a negotiable
instrument may depend upon whether he is a holder in due course,
the Code provides certain rules concerning the burden of establish-
ing the holder's position. Signatures are admitted unless specifically
denied in the pleadings9" and are presumed genuine unless the pur-
ported signer-obligor has died or become incompetent before proof
is required.91 If there is no question of the genuineness of signatures
then any holder is entitled to recover unless a defense is estab-
lished.9 2 If a defense exists then the party claiming the rights of a
holder in due course has the burden of "establishing that he or some
person under whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due
course.
'93
86U.C.C. § 3-606.
87U.C.C. § 3-606(1) (a).
88U.C.C. § 3-606(1)(b).
89U.C.C. § 3-415(5).
90U.C.C. § 3-307(1).
91U.C.C. § 3-307(1) (a).
92 U.C.C. § 3-307(2).
93U.C.C. § 3-307(3).
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SUCCESSORS TO HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE.
Under the Code as under the N.I.L.94 a party, who is not himself
a holder in due course of the instrument, may nevertheless have the
rights of one who is a holder in due course. Section 3-201 of the
Code provides that a transferee has such rights in the instrument as
does his transferor. If the transferee has only a security interest
in the instrument, as for example, if the transferee is a pledgee of
the instrument, the transferee has these rights only to the extent
of the interest transferred.95 The Code makes an exception to the
general rule that a transferee takes the rights of the transferor by
providing that a transferee who has been "a party to any fraud or
illegality affecting the instrument or who as a prior holder had
notice of a defense or claim against it cannot improve his position
by taking from a later holder in due course."96
For a transferee to be a holder in due course in his own right
he must of course meet the requirements of section 3-302 of the
Code. Usually a transferee is not a holder because an instrument
payable to order has not been indorsed by the transferor. Under the
Code a transferee who gives value is entitled to the unqualified
indorsement unless the parties have agreed otherwise. 97 Negotia-
tion to the transferee occurs when the instrument is indorsed, and
if the then holder seeks to establish himself as a holder in due
course he must, of course, be without notice of a claim or defense at
the time of negotiation.
CONCLUSION
Article 3 of the Commercial Code presents a systematic treat-
ment and modernization of the law of commercial paper. Due to
the nature of the subject matter, the same mass of detail which was
presented by the N.I.L. and the cases decided thereunder win still
exist under Article 3. For better or worse, there can be little doubt
that the courts, in deciding cases under the Code, will resort to
the provisions of the N.I.L. and the cases applying those provisions
until a representative body of case law under the Code comes into
existence. Since the Code settles many areas of conflict which
existed under the N.I.L., its adoption in Nebraska will obviate many
potential disputes in areas in which the Supreme Court of Nebraska
has not spoken.
94 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 62-149, 62-158 (Reissue 1958).
95U.C.C. § 3-201(2).
D §U.C.C. 3-201(1).
97 U.C.C.§ 3-201(3).
